Corrigendum to: Product Quality and Product Compatibility in Network Industries

Abstract Using an appropriate game-theoretic approach, this article develops a non-cooperative two-stage game in a Cournot duopolistic network industry in which firms strategically choose whether to produce compatible goods in the first decision-making stage. Quality differentiation affects the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE): (i) the network effect acts differently between low- and high-quality firms, depending on their compatibility choice; (ii) if the network externality is positive (resp. negative), to produce compatible (resp. incompatible) goods is the unique SPNE; however, this equilibrium configuration leads the high-quality firm to be worse off; (iii) there is room for a side payment from the high- to the low-quality firm to deviate toward incompatibility (resp. compatibility) under positive (resp. negative) network externality. This payment represents a Pareto improvement on the firm side but not from a societal perspective, as consumers would be worse off. The article also pinpoints the social welfare outcomes corresponding to the SPNE.