AProVer Front-End Modelling Language for Designing Security Protocols

Abstract In the rapidly evolving field of cybersecurity, the design and verification of secure communication protocols are essential to protect data across a wide range of platforms, devices, and networks. To ensure these protocols remain effective and resilient against attacks, it is crucial to strengthen the principle of security by design , and therefore provide protocol designers with a simple and intuitive notation that simplifies both the construction of secure protocols and their translation into input models for verifying key security protocols. This paper presents a comprehensive metamodel for specifying security protocols, serving as the foundation for both a textual (KANT) and a visual notation. The metamodel was designed to offer a clear and unambiguous language for describing the components and behaviours of security protocols, enabling accurate modelling, analysis, and verification. It facilitates seamless transitions between textual and graphical representations, enhancing both clarity and flexibility. This dual-notation language significantly improves usability, accessibility, and in-depth protocol analysis. It serves as the front-end language for AProVer, a comprehensive framework that supports various types of security protocol analysis designed to be user-friendly, bridging the gap between designers’ varying backgrounds and formal notations.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
SN Computer Science
Published
2025-12-02
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s42979-025-04284-8
Primary Topic
Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

Funders

Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

AProVer Front-End Modelling Language for Designing Security Protocols

Elvinia Riccobene, Mario Lilli, Chiara Braghin
SN Computer Science
Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
article

AProVer Front-End Modelling Language for Designing Security Protocols

Elvinia Riccobene, Mario Lilli, Chiara Braghin
article en

Abstract

Abstract In the rapidly evolving field of cybersecurity, the design and verification of secure communication protocols are essential to protect data across a wide range of platforms, devices, and networks. To ensure these protocols remain effective and resilient against attacks, it is crucial to strengthen the principle of security by design , and therefore provide protocol designers with a simple and intuitive notation that simplifies both the construction of secure protocols and their translation into input models for verifying key security protocols. This paper presents a comprehensive metamodel for specifying security protocols, serving as the foundation for both a textual (KANT) and a visual notation. The metamodel was designed to offer a clear and unambiguous language for describing the components and behaviours of security protocols, enabling accurate modelling, analysis, and verification. It facilitates seamless transitions between textual and graphical representations, enhancing both clarity and flexibility. This dual-notation language significantly improves usability, accessibility, and in-depth protocol analysis. It serves as the front-end language for AProVer, a comprehensive framework that supports various types of security protocol analysis designed to be user-friendly, bridging the gap between designers’ varying backgrounds and formal notations.

SN Computer ScienceVol. 6(8)
University of Milan (IT)
European Commission
Openalex Percentile: Top 57%
Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.