The Cost of Dying

This paper explores the metaphysical and normative dimensions of death within a biological naturalist framework. It defends the view that persons are contingently identical with their animal bodies and argues that life has only instrumental value—deriving its significance from the experiences, relationships, and projects it enables. On this view, death is not harmful in itself but is a misfortune insofar as it deprives individuals of these goods and interrupts their capacity to engage in meaningful pursuits. The analysis draws on two complementary frameworks: Nagel’s deprivation account and the interruption thesis advanced by Furley and Nussbaum. To respond to key Epicurean objections—such as the symmetry argument and the temporality problem—the paper adopts a comparative and atemporal perspective on harm. It further refines the interruption thesis by distinguishing between egocentric and nonegocentric projects, clarifying why posthumous fulfillment of a person’s aims does not mitigate the harm of death. By integrating these perspectives, the paper offers a unified account of death’s badness: it is a dual harm involving both the loss of potential goods and the personal deprivation of actively shaping and completing one’s own life projects.