Detecting Structural Deficiencies in China’s Legal Framework on Multinational Corporate Commercial Bribery: Liability Gaps and Reform Imperatives
This paper systematically analyses the criminal, civil, and administrative liabilities of multinational corporations for commercial bribery under Chinese law. Using a dual-perspective framework, it examines China’s legal role both as a home country, regulating outbound bribery by domestic enterprises, and as a host country, addressing bribery committed by foreign companies within its territory. The criminal liability section assesses the application and limitations of Articles 164 and 393 of the Criminal Law. The civil dimension explores relevant provisions of the Civil Code, Company Law, and Anti-Unfair Competition Law regarding contract invalidation, unjust enrichment, tort damages, and managerial responsibility. The administrative part evaluates enforcement powers under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, including fines, disgorgement, and business licence revocation. The paper identifies structural deficiencies in China’s legal framework, including fragmented enforcement, insufficient compliance incentives, and limited extraterritorial jurisdiction. Through comparison with the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010, it argues that China’s current approach remains largely punitive and reactive, with inadequate emphasis on preventive and coordinated enforcement. Rather than proposing specific legal reforms, the paper adopts a doctrinal and comparative methodology to expose institutional weaknesses and provide a theoretical basis for future reform-oriented research.
Authors
- Eliya Hamizah Halim (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0002-7670-498X)
- Ma Jiao (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0000-4817-1763)
Institutions
- Multimedia University (MY)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Asian Journal of Law and Policy
- Published
- 2025-12-01
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.33093/ajlp.2025.13
- Primary Topic
- Regulation and Compliance Studies
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00