Conversion and drift of traditional institutions under democratization: case of the ‘evolved’ household registration system in Taiwan

The Household Registration System (HRS) is commonly regarded as an instrument of social control and undemocratic. Paradoxically, it still survives in some electoral democracies with limited calls for its abandonment. This thematic study examines the HRS from a new Asian democracy, Taiwan, and responds to this puzzling phenomenon: why is this system still maintained after democratization? Taiwan has universal suffrage since 1996 but its HRS remains after 30 years of full democracy. This article reviews the evolution of the HRS in Taiwan from authoritarian through the democratic era and explores the rationales for its standstill after three decades of electoral democracy through the lens of institutional conversion and drift. The functions of the HRS in Taiwan have no longer been social control as in its outset. Its preservation in the democratic context without substantial reform has also accounted for several maladministration and corrupt phenomena.