Assigning tasks to pairs
Abstract We study the problem of an organization that has a large number of potential tasks and has to choose which tasks to handle and which pair of experts should be assigned to each of them. We propose a mechanism that generates a Pareto-efficient assignment in the weak core and is group strategy-proof. The assignment rule generated by this mechanism is characterized by four axioms: Pareto-efficiency, the Weak Core property, Restricted Maskin Monotonicity and Invariance with respect to Deleted Links. The last two axioms are invariance properties with respect to specific preference changes.
Authors
- Sonal Yadav (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2461-8345)
- Pietro Salmaso (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3078-8575)
- Antonio Nicolò (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5405-4889)
- Arunava Sen (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1796-2623)
Institutions
- University of Padua (IT)
- University of Liverpool (GB)
- University of Manchester (GB)
- Federico II University Hospital (IT)
- Indian Statistical Institute (IN)
- University of Naples Federico II (IT)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Economic Theory
- Published
- 2025-11-29
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-025-01693-x
- Primary Topic
- Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II