Aristotle’s Principles of Individuation. From Metaphysics to Zoology and Back

Abstract In this article, I address the debated and long-standing question of what the principle of individuation in Aristotle’s philosophy is. My claim is that individuation does not have a single principle or cause but is a process that has a threefold cause: a certain form, a certain matter, and a certain mover. My overall argument unfolds in four stages: firstly, I briefly summarize the debate on this issue and provide some clarifications on terminology. Next, I show what the critical issues are in taking form or matter as the only principles of individuation. Thirdly, I state my thesis on the triple causality of individuation in Aristotle, arguing on the basis of a passage from Metaphysics Λ 5. Fourthly and lastly, I examine the generation of animals as a process of individuation, to show that the three causes of individuation illustrated by the Metaphysics are also found in the zoological studies. This convergence of causes makes it possible to give an answer to the quarrel over individuation and to interpret it as a process that is marked by accident and not by teleology.