Not So Simple! Primitive Concepts and the Threat of Spinozism in the Pre-Critical Kant

Abstract Kant’s precritical possibility proof for the existence of God is often thought to have Spinozistic implications. One important reason for this is that Kant’s reasoning in the Beweisgrund appears to entail that God is extended or spatial. Kant argues that God exemplifies all primitive predicates. Since he also treats extension as such a primitive predicate, it seems to straightforwardly follow that God is extended. This paper argues that Kant’s argument in the Beweisgrund does not, in fact, lead to this Spinozistic conclusion. Importantly, Kant distinguishes between concepts that are primitive for us and concepts that are primitive in themselves. This distinction equips Kant with the resources to block the Spinozistic conclusion that God is extended: he can accept that extension is a primitive concept for us and at the same time reject that extension is a concept primitive in itself, and thus exemplified by God.