Research on Power Battery Recycling Decision Considering Deposit System Under Online Platform Recycling Mode

To promote the effective recycling of power batteries and solve the industry dilemma of “missing used batteries”, the deposit system and blockchain technology are regarded as important policy and technical tools. This paper constructs a power battery closed-loop supply chain composed of a battery manufacturer and an online platform, considering two power structures of platforms with and without pricing power, respectively. This study employs Stackelberg game theory, and through modeling and optimization analysis, the optimal pricing, blockchain investment level, and profit of the supply chain under different deposit collectors are explored. The results discuss the following: (1) whether the online platform maintaining the right to recover pricing fundamentally changes the incentive mechanism and efficiency level of the supply chain. When the platform holds the pricing power, its blockchain technology investment level and profit potential are significantly higher than that of its agent model. (2) Deposit as a different attribute of cost or income determines the different pricing logic of enterprises. (3) To maximize the application of innovative technologies such as blockchain in recycling systems, governments, manufacturers, and platforms should strive to promote the application of government–manufacturers deposits modes.

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Publication Details

Journal
Applied Sciences
Published
2025-11-25
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/app152312514
Primary Topic
Extraction and Separation Processes
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Research on Power Battery Recycling Decision Considering Deposit System Under Online Platform Recycling Mode

Zhi‐Yuan Wan, Yuxi Cui, Chunyi Ji
Applied Sciences
Extraction and Separation Processes
article

Research on Power Battery Recycling Decision Considering Deposit System Under Online Platform Recycling Mode

Zhi‐Yuan Wan, Yuxi Cui, Chunyi Ji
article en

Abstract

To promote the effective recycling of power batteries and solve the industry dilemma of “missing used batteries”, the deposit system and blockchain technology are regarded as important policy and technical tools. This paper constructs a power battery closed-loop supply chain composed of a battery manufacturer and an online platform, considering two power structures of platforms with and without pricing power, respectively. This study employs Stackelberg game theory, and through modeling and optimization analysis, the optimal pricing, blockchain investment level, and profit of the supply chain under different deposit collectors are explored. The results discuss the following: (1) whether the online platform maintaining the right to recover pricing fundamentally changes the incentive mechanism and efficiency level of the supply chain. When the platform holds the pricing power, its blockchain technology investment level and profit potential are significantly higher than that of its agent model. (2) Deposit as a different attribute of cost or income determines the different pricing logic of enterprises. (3) To maximize the application of innovative technologies such as blockchain in recycling systems, governments, manufacturers, and platforms should strive to promote the application of government–manufacturers deposits modes.

Applied SciencesVol. 15(23)
Jiangnan University (CN)
National Social Science Fund of China
Openalex Percentile: Top 62%
Extraction and Separation Processes
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