Deleuze's epistemology of inquiry

Abstract In this article, I describe Deleuze's theory of knowledge as set out in Difference & Repetition . First, I show that despite Deleuze's hostility toward a knowledge‐centered approach to philosophy, we should nevertheless read him as having an epistemological theory. Second, I examine Deleuze's theory of knowledge by proceeding from a discussion of learning as a process of resolving practical problems to a discussion of Deleuze's theory of questions. Questions, I show, express practical imperatives that set problems into motion. Knowledge, then, is a case of solution to this question via a grappling with the problems that it brings about. I end by discussing a key feature of Deleuzian knowledge: that it never answers once and for all the problems and questions from which it springs. Instead, an instance of knowledge should be understood as one possible resolution to the practical problem it answers.