Freedom as Non-Interference, Responsibility for Harms, and Pandemic Policy

Abstract This paper examines Kieran Oberman’s original application of a particular conception of freedom as non-interference to justify lockdowns during a pandemic. Oberman claims that lockdowns can be justified exclusively on the basis of the value of freedom. He also suggests that people who protested against lockdowns by demanding freedom did not fully grasp the value to which they appealed. This paper argues that the conception of freedom as non-interference Oberman employs is not useful as a guide to make public health policy decisions. This is because it unnecessarily multiplies the freedoms that need to be considered, and unhelpfully reinterprets easily understood harms such as severe illness and death in terms of loss of freedom. This paper argues that this conception of freedom also leads to counterintuitive assessments. Finally, the paper proposes three ways of thinking about freedom that seem better to capture the sense of loss of freedom during the pandemic and the corresponding political demands expressed in protests.