The Political Economy of La Paz: Brazilian and Chilean Investments in Haiti during the UN Stabilization Mission (2004–2019)

The article examines the political economy of the UN peacekeeping era in Haiti from 2004 to 2019 as a set of practices and institutions through which Brazilian and Chilean investments were made, including state, semi-state, and corporate channels, as well as their connection to mechanisms of security governance and development. The central subject of analysis is the forms, sectoral directions, and political conditions of Brazil and Chile's involvement in Haiti's economic space, as well as the impact of the peacekeeping regime on the distribution of benefits and costs for the host country. The article reconstructs a specific model of "investment support for peacekeeping," in which the economic presence of Brazil and Chile developed in close association with their politico-military role in the UN mission, allowing for the institutional consolidation of priority sectors and forms of market access. It is shown that the investment strategies of both countries had a cooperative yet competitive nature, resulting in the formation of asymmetric resource distribution regimes that intensified the Haitian economy's dependence on external management and financial frameworks. The conclusion is drawn that the peacekeeping framework from 2004 to 2019 served not only as a security tool but also as a factor redistributing economic opportunities in favor of external players, with limited structural modernization in Haiti. The research applied document analysis, quantitative methods, statistical analysis, and comparative data studies. The political economy of "La-Paz" in Haiti from 2004 to 2019 was formed as an institutionally anchored connection between peacekeeping governance and foreign economic presence. The UN mission, having an expanded mandate and coordination powers, not only acted as a guarantor of security but also as an internal regulator of access to reconstruction and donor resources, objectively creating advantages for participating states with the greatest role in the mission. As a result of the comparative analysis, it is shown that the Brazilian strategy relied on military leadership and therefore had a higher capacity to convert peacekeeping resources into economic presence. Brazil's infrastructure, police, and technical programs developed within a unified logic of state-building mandate, confirming the thesis of the inevitable inclusion of the economic dimension in long-term stabilization operations.