A unified representational theory of the feeling of effort

Given its importance for understanding intentional agency, it is surprising, and somewhat concerning, that there is no general and satisfactory theory of the feeling of effort. To be satisfactory the theory must answer the question posed by Bermúdez in his recent paper: ‘What is the feeling of effort about?’ (2023). To be general, it must capture, in a unified framework, all subspecies of effort. In this paper I develop a unified representational theory of the feeling of effort, starting with the idea that the feeling of effort is the feeling of trying-against-resistance. I show that for all three sub-species of effort - effort of will, cognitive effort and muscular effort - the proximate force that is both necessary and sufficient for a trying to feel effortful is of a single, conative, kind. Thus, feelings of effort reveal the existence of both pro- and con- motives, and of conflict between the two. An effortful action is an action because it is motivated, but it is effortful because it is conatively controversial.