Contextual negation by moral opposition: rethinking the ethics of (Rape) simulations

Abstract This paper draws a moral comparison between technologically facilitated rape simulations and rape simulations between humans. Specifically, it investigates a previously unexplored ethical puzzle: while many regard the use of ‘rapebots’—sex robots designed specifically for rape simulations—as morally impermissible, the practice of consensual non-consent (CNC), i.e. consensual rape role-play between human partners, appears less troubling. Yet, both are instances of rape simulations where all individuals capable of granting or withholding consent do consent. Are rapebot use and CNC, therefore, morally equivalent? I argue that they are not. Although rapebot use and CNC share similar content, they differ structurally: the former involves a solitary individual enacting fantasies unilaterally, while the latter occurs within a relational framework, foregrounding consent, negotiation, and respect. To explain why this structural difference matters morally, I introduce the mechanism of contextual negation by moral opposition . This mechanism posits that simulations of wrongdoing can be morally mitigated when their context explicitly affirms the values the simulated act would violate. While this can apply to CNC, it necessarily fails for rapebot use. Therefore, although some cases of CNC are morally permissible, the use of rapebots is always impermissible. This argument has broader implications for the ethics of technologically facilitated simulations.