The Challenge of “Defining” Emotions

Taking a cognitive perspective on emotions as generally exemplified by appraisal theories, I suggest that attempts to "define" emotions is a theoretical exercise whose goal should be to specify necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for something to be an emotion. To this end, I advance arguments in support of the proposal that genuine emotions have the five necessary characteristics of being (i) intentional (i.e., about something), (ii) personally significant, (iii) valenced, (iv) consciously experienced, and (v) insuppressible. Collectively, these properties distinguish emotions from other kinds of mental states. I also argue that attempts to define emotions should resist the temptation to incorporate into definitions characteristics of emotions that are not always present, even though, when they are present, those characteristics may be typical and highly salient. It is suggested that two characteristics that are routinely taken to be constitutive of emotions-bodily changes and facial expression-are just such characteristics; they are typical and salient but not in fact necessary as evidenced by the fact that many (especially low intensity) emotions occur without them.