Beyond Physicalism? Quine's Open‐Ended Naturalism and the Possibility of the “Supernatural”

Abstract This paper argues that W. V. Quine, often seen as scientific naturalism's foremost champion, advances an expansive ontology that leaves room for so‐called supernatural phenomena—telepathy or clairvoyance—if they satisfy appropriate empirical tests. Contrary to the image of a rigid physicalist, Quine's methodological continuity and fallibilism permit provisional inclusion of any entity, “physical” or not, when theoretically and empirically fruitful. His resolve to start “in the middle” and treat philosophy as continuous with science contrasts with stricter naturalisms that categorically dismiss paranormal claims. Simultaneously, Quine rejects a priori philosophical pronouncements, denying autonomous or irreducible normativity beyond empirical science. Distinguishing Quine's “soft” naturalism from reductive physicalism and liberal naturalist views, the paper shows his position as inclusive regarding empirically testable phenomena yet methodologically monistic in privileging science as ultimate arbiter of ontological disputes. Quine's openness to unconventional hypotheses underscores that naturalism need not be metaphysically dogmatic but must remain anchored in empirical inquiry.

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Publication Details

Journal
Metaphilosophy
Published
2025-11-25
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.70027
Primary Topic
Philosophy and History of Science
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Beyond Physicalism? Quine's Open‐Ended Naturalism and the Possibility of the “Supernatural”

Serdal Tümkaya
Metaphilosophy
Philosophy and History of Science
article

Beyond Physicalism? Quine's Open‐Ended Naturalism and the Possibility of the “Supernatural”

Serdal Tümkaya
article en

Abstract

Abstract This paper argues that W. V. Quine, often seen as scientific naturalism's foremost champion, advances an expansive ontology that leaves room for so‐called supernatural phenomena—telepathy or clairvoyance—if they satisfy appropriate empirical tests. Contrary to the image of a rigid physicalist, Quine's methodological continuity and fallibilism permit provisional inclusion of any entity, “physical” or not, when theoretically and empirically fruitful. His resolve to start “in the middle” and treat philosophy as continuous with science contrasts with stricter naturalisms that categorically dismiss paranormal claims. Simultaneously, Quine rejects a priori philosophical pronouncements, denying autonomous or irreducible normativity beyond empirical science. Distinguishing Quine's “soft” naturalism from reductive physicalism and liberal naturalist views, the paper shows his position as inclusive regarding empirically testable phenomena yet methodologically monistic in privileging science as ultimate arbiter of ontological disputes. Quine's openness to unconventional hypotheses underscores that naturalism need not be metaphysically dogmatic but must remain anchored in empirical inquiry.

MetaphilosophyVol. 57(1-2)
Ibn Haldun University (TR)
Openalex Percentile: Top 58%
Philosophy and History of Science
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