No New Work for Metaphysics: Easy Ontology and Two‐Dimensional Semantics

Abstract The twelfth volume of Oxford Studies in Metaphysics begins with a debate between Amie Thomasson and Ross Cameron on the nature of metaphysics. In short, Thomasson defends her “easy ontology” position that there are no substantive metaphysical questions and argues against Cameron's position, according to which truthmaker questions are not easy. Cameron responds by criticizing Thomasson's easy ontology and defending truthmaker metaphysics. This paper defends Thomasson. Specifically, it argues that Cameron (1) distorts epistemic two‐dimensionalism's notion of epistemic possibility, (2) falls prey to the Picture Theory of language he claims (rightly) to reject, and (3) begs the question against Thomasson by assuming that her modal normativism is false. The defense is valuable more widely because it clarifies the relations between easy ontology, modal normativism, truthmaker metaphysics, and two‐dimensional semantics.