Le problème de l’appartenance chez Fink

If it is true that “the life of the world disposes of every individual being; […] causes things to be born and to pass away, to grow and to disappear, […] puts things into their individualised being and takes them away again – […] occurs as a universal individualisation of every finite being”, we must recognise that the Being’s sense of being envelops its belonging to the world. Nevertheless, although Fink never ceases to assert this, the way in which he thinks about this belonging remains rather confused. Insofar as he includes in the account of the world both the being that we are, characterised by understanding, and other beings, the question arises as to how it is possible to reconcile the univocity of belonging to the world, commanded by his cosmological perspective, with the difference, which he also emphasises, between subjects and other beings.