The Logical Use of Reason in the First Critique and Its Connection with the Reflective Power of Judgment

Abstract In the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason , Kant introduces the ideal of systematicity , represented by the connection of three principles of reason. At the core of the discussion in the Appendix is the distinction between the constitutive use of concepts of understanding and the regulative use of ideas of reason. This article shows that certain passages from the Appendix suggest that Kant’s concept of the “use” ( Gebrauch ) of a rule could explain an interpretative difficulty that arises in paragraph 70 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment . In this passage, the principle of the causality of nature (originally a constitutive–critical principle) seems to be assimilated to the thesis ( Satz ) of an antinomy composed of merely regulative principles. This article aims to demonstrate that this assimilation is impossible.