Inability, Perspective, and the Deliberative Ought

Abstract Many scholars maintain that the kind of ‘ought’ which the subject is after in deliberation is constrained by the subject’s perspective or by what is feasible for that subject. One principle invoked in support of this position refers to a special guidance-giving feature of the deliberative ought. While being a promising way to support the perspectivist and feasibilist verdicts, this appeal to guidance has been subject to detrimental counterexamples: cases in which the subject is ignorant of their own inability to intend the best-looking course of action. This paper provides a novel response in defence of the guidance thesis, which builds on the connection of the deliberative ought and deliberative questions. An overlooked issue in the literature concerns the presuppositions raised by the central deliberative question. I provide the first attempt at analysing these presuppositions and argue that, in cases in which these presuppositions are not satisfied, there is no particular option the subject deliberatively ought to do. Finally, I show that the supposed counterexamples are such instances of presupposition failure.