Capital Structure in French Family Firms After COVID-19: A Pecking Order Reassessment

We examine how firms finance deficits when cash is tight, focusing on French private family firms and the COVID-19 period. In an under-studied, bank-based setting (France, 2003–2024), we reassess whether pecking-order behavior is stronger under family control and whether the gap with non-family firms widened after 2020. We find that family firms consistently use debt to bridge shortfalls, whereas comparable non-family firms rely less on new borrowing; this difference increases post-COVID, in line with policy-driven easing of bank credit and the importance of relationship lending. The amplification is stronger in credit-intensive sectors and for firms with deeper bank ties. The results, presented without strong causal claims, connect control preservation and intermediation to marginal financing choices and highlight a policy trade-off between short-run stabilization and later deleveraging.