Competition–Cooperation Relationship and Profit Allocation Between Virtual and Traditional Power Plants Under Energy Transition

Virtual power plants (VPPs) can achieve optimized energy management through digital technologies and the integration of diversified energy sources. However, their complex competitive–cooperative dynamics with traditional power plants in market operations, coupled with undefined benefit-sharing mechanisms, require systematic investigation. This study establishes a standalone capacity configuration model for independent VPP operations and a cooperative game-theoretic model for collaborative interactions with traditional power plants, focusing on three critical dimensions: energy transition dynamics, symbiotic cooperation mechanisms, and equitable revenue distribution. Through examining optimal distributed resource allocation and cooperative profit-sharing frameworks under market equilibrium conditions, key findings emerge: (1) VPPs demonstrate robust investment attractiveness in independent operation modes. (2) Collaborative scenarios with conventional plants generate mutual economic enhancement, with Shapley value solutions providing equitable benefit apportionment. (3) Intensified governmental intervention induces diminishing marginal returns for VPPs, whereas strengthened collaboration counteracts this effect through enhanced marginal productivity. The conclusions provide a theoretical foundation and decision-support frameworks for the economic operation of VPPs and the grid integration of high-proportion renewable energy sources.