Selective (dis)honesty: Choosing overly positive feedback only when the truth hurts

In two studies (N = 886), we examined how individuals judge and select feedback providers for those who either handle criticism well or poorly after performing a low-quality task. Prosocial liars who provided overly positive feedback, were judged as more moral than honest feedback providers. However, despite this, honest feedback providers were preferred for both oneself and others. Interestingly, when choosing a feedback provider for a vulnerable recipient versus a generic other, participants preferred a prosocial liar in the former case. Similarly, a 'sensitive' feedback provider, defined as someone who tells the truth to individuals who handle criticism well but offers overly positive feedback to those who struggle, was also favoured when the recipient was vulnerable compared with when the recipient was unspecified. Notably, the sensitive provider was not judged as less moral than the honest one, suggesting that inconsistent (dis)honesty is tolerated when it aligns with social needs. These findings indicate that individuals strategically adjust preferences for honesty versus lying based on social cues.

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Publication Details

Journal
British Journal of Social Psychology
Published
2025-11-23
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.70020
Primary Topic
Deception detection and forensic psychology
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Selective (dis)honesty: Choosing overly positive feedback only when the truth hurts

Katarzyna Cantarero, Michał Białek
British Journal of Social Psychology
Deception detection and forensic psychology
article

Selective (dis)honesty: Choosing overly positive feedback only when the truth hurts

Katarzyna Cantarero, Michał Białek
article en

Abstract

In two studies (N = 886), we examined how individuals judge and select feedback providers for those who either handle criticism well or poorly after performing a low-quality task. Prosocial liars who provided overly positive feedback, were judged as more moral than honest feedback providers. However, despite this, honest feedback providers were preferred for both oneself and others. Interestingly, when choosing a feedback provider for a vulnerable recipient versus a generic other, participants preferred a prosocial liar in the former case. Similarly, a 'sensitive' feedback provider, defined as someone who tells the truth to individuals who handle criticism well but offers overly positive feedback to those who struggle, was also favoured when the recipient was vulnerable compared with when the recipient was unspecified. Notably, the sensitive provider was not judged as less moral than the honest one, suggesting that inconsistent (dis)honesty is tolerated when it aligns with social needs. These findings indicate that individuals strategically adjust preferences for honesty versus lying based on social cues.

British Journal of Social PsychologyVol. 65(1)
University of Wrocław (PL), Wrocław University of Environmental and Life Sciences (PL), Wroclaw University of Economics and Business (PL), University of Bristol (GB), Uniwersytet SWPS (PL), Wroclaw University of Health and Sport Sciences (PL)
Narodowe Centrum Nauki
Openalex Percentile: Top 59%
Deception detection and forensic psychology
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Selective (dis)honesty: Choosing overly positive feedback only when the truth hurts — Katarzyna Cantarero, Michał Białek · British Journal of Social Psychology (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS