Rethinking Tamper-Evident Logging: A High-Performance, Co-Designed Auditing System
Existing tamper-evident logging systems suffer from high overhead and severe data loss in high-load settings, yet only provide coarse-grained tamper detection. Moreover, installing such systems requires recompiling kernel code. To address these challenges, we present Nitro, a high-performance, tamper-evident audit logging system that supports fine-grained detection of log tampering. Even better, our system avoids kernel recompilation by using the eBPF technology. To formally justify the security of Nitro, we provide a new definitional framework for logging systems, and give a practical cryptographic construction meeting this new goal. Unlike prior work that focus only on the cryptographic processing, we codesign the cryptographic part with the pre- and post-processing of the logs to exploit all system-level optimizations. Our evaluations demonstrate Nitro's superior performance, achieving 10X-25X improvements in high-stress conditions and 2X-10X in real-world scenarios while maintaining near-zero data loss. We also provide an advanced variant, Nitro-R that introduces in-kernel log reduction techniques to reduce runtime overhead even further.
Authors
- Viet Tung Hoang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3092-6405)
- Rui Zhao (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-7898-6831)
- Wajih Ul Hassan (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5676-6027)
- Muhammad Shoaib (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0008-2009-9542)
Institutions
- Florida State University (US)
- University of Virginia (US)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-11-19
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3719027.3765024
- Citations
- 1
- Primary Topic
- Security and Verification in Computing
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 2.48
Funders
- National Science Foundation