Fingerprinting Deep Packet Inspection Devices by their Ambiguities
Users around the world face escalating network interference such as censorship, throttling, and interception, largely driven by the commoditization and growing availability of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) devices. Once reserved for a few well-resourced nation-state actors, the ability to interfere with traffic at scale is now within reach of nearly any network operator. Despite this proliferation, our understanding of DPIs and their deployments on the Internet remains limited---being network intermediary leaves DPI unresponsive to conventional host-based scanning tools, and DPI vendors actively obscuring their products further complicates measurement efforts.
Authors
- Ram Sundara Raman (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2411-8463)
- Diwen Xue (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0616-4765)
- Wayne Wang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0008-7553-5612)
- Roya Ensafi (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2188-8267)
- Armin Huremagic (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0001-8976-4044)
Institutions
- University of California, Santa Cruz (US)
- University of Michigan (US)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-11-19
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3719027.3765145
- Primary Topic
- Network Packet Processing and Optimization
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- National Science Foundation