Dishonesty: The role of planning, temptation, and self-control
Accumulated evidence shows that, when people face the opportunity to cheat, they often take it. However, it remains unclear whether this behavior reflects a genuine preference for dishonesty or a lack of self-control in the face of temptation. To address this question, we apply the temptation and self-control framework of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) to cheating opportunities and experimentally test its predictions for the first time. We find that (i) only 5 % of participants are willing to pay to avoid a cheating opportunity and (ii) 90 % exhibit consistent planning. Specifically, those who deliberately seek out cheating opportunities exploit them (50 %), and those who do not seek out remain honest when confronted with them (40 %). This evidence suggests that temptation plays a limited role while ruling out both naivete and uncertainty about future behavior.
Authors
- Ivan Soraperra (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4596-3885)
- Daniele Caliari (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2105-381X)
Institutions
- WZB Berlin Social Science Center (DE)
- Max Planck Institute for Human Development (DE)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Published
- 2025-11-22
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107323
- Primary Topic
- Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00