Dishonesty: The role of planning, temptation, and self-control

Accumulated evidence shows that, when people face the opportunity to cheat, they often take it. However, it remains unclear whether this behavior reflects a genuine preference for dishonesty or a lack of self-control in the face of temptation. To address this question, we apply the temptation and self-control framework of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) to cheating opportunities and experimentally test its predictions for the first time. We find that (i) only 5 % of participants are willing to pay to avoid a cheating opportunity and (ii) 90 % exhibit consistent planning. Specifically, those who deliberately seek out cheating opportunities exploit them (50 %), and those who do not seek out remain honest when confronted with them (40 %). This evidence suggests that temptation plays a limited role while ruling out both naivete and uncertainty about future behavior.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Published
2025-11-22
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107323
Primary Topic
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Dishonesty: The role of planning, temptation, and self-control

Ivan Soraperra, Daniele Caliari
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
article

Dishonesty: The role of planning, temptation, and self-control

Ivan Soraperra, Daniele Caliari
article en

Abstract

Accumulated evidence shows that, when people face the opportunity to cheat, they often take it. However, it remains unclear whether this behavior reflects a genuine preference for dishonesty or a lack of self-control in the face of temptation. To address this question, we apply the temptation and self-control framework of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) to cheating opportunities and experimentally test its predictions for the first time. We find that (i) only 5 % of participants are willing to pay to avoid a cheating opportunity and (ii) 90 % exhibit consistent planning. Specifically, those who deliberately seek out cheating opportunities exploit them (50 %), and those who do not seek out remain honest when confronted with them (40 %). This evidence suggests that temptation plays a limited role while ruling out both naivete and uncertainty about future behavior.

Journal of Economic Behavior & OrganizationVol. 240
WZB Berlin Social Science Center (DE), Max Planck Institute for Human Development (DE)
Openalex Percentile: Top 64%
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
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Dishonesty: The role of planning, temptation, and self-control — Ivan Soraperra, Daniele Caliari · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS