Competition and equilibrium in future global renewable hydrogen trade: A game-theoretic analysis

Global renewable hydrogen trade is expected to play a key role in decarbonizing future energy systems. Yet hydrogen exporters may deviate from perfectly competitive behaviour to influence prices, similarly to the existing fossil fuel market, with important implications for consumer welfare and the pace of the energy transition. This study develops a global renewable hydrogen trade model that captures potential strategic interactions among exporters using a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework. The model is formulated as an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) and solved under three alternative equilibria: a profit-maximizing Nash equilibrium, a cost-minimizing Nash equilibrium, and a welfare-maximizing benchmark representing perfect competition. Results indicate that producers may strategically reduce their export quantities by up to 40 % relative to perfect competition to maximize profits. Such behaviour raises prices to a minimum of 4.5 USD/kg in 2050 across major import markets, thereby significantly eroding consumer surplus. Strategic behaviour of dominant exporters also shifts trade flows, reshaping the global allocation of hydrogen supply. Sensitivity analysis further reveals that financing costs play a key role in shaping strategic producers' behaviour, with lower financing costs helping to reduce prices and stimulate demand. These findings highlight the implications of imperfect competition in global hydrogen trade and suggest that policy measures may be needed to mitigate potential negative consequences. • A new and more realistic game theoretic framework for hydrogen energy trade is formulated. • Producer market power is found to be a significant factor in price setting of hydrogen. • Producer profit-seeking actions can erode consumer surplus by up to US$44bn in 2050. • Trade flows increase significantly from 25 Mt. to 42 Mt. under a social welfare objective.