Freedom of Thought and Digital Technologies: Operationalizing State Obligations for Social Media, Virtual Reality, and Neurotechnology

Abstract Freedom of thought is among the strongest human rights, yet it is largely devoid of practical legal application. This article operationalizes the right by distilling ten core aspects, mainly psychological capacities such as attention, meta-control over thought, and rational belief formation. It then examines how these aspects may be adversely affected by three digital technologies: neurotechnologies, virtual reality, and especially social media. The article addresses why the use of digital technologies might be a human rights issue at all and the doctrinal challenge associated with it. People use these technologies voluntarily, and detrimental effects tend to arise from a multitude of diffuse stimuli rather than from discrete identifiable interventions by a specific human -rights-bound actor. This complicates, and often renders impossible, findings of conventional interferences with rights. But this may not exhaust the remit of human rights. Another human rights-based perspective is proposed: Detrimental effects on thought might be conceptualized as risks arising from a digital environment, which may prompt States’ obligations to fulfil the enjoyment of the right by securing its factual–in this case, psychological–preconditions. A prime measure to meet this obligation is the regulation of technology through innovative models such as a freedom-of-thought impact assessment, or freedom-of-thought-sensitive technology design, for which the ten aspects provide a workable foundation.