Reward processing under illusion of control: The sensitivity of the feedback-related negativity to prediction errors is not altered when random outcomes are perceived as the consequence of one's own actions

The feedback-related negativity (FRN) has been associated both with the cortical processing of reward and salience prediction errors (RPEs/SPEs), and with behavioral adjustments that optimize performance. While the FRN is sensitive to response-feedback contingencies, it remains to be explored how this waveform is influenced by random outcomes during reinforcement learning (RL) while participants develop an illusion of control (IoC). We present novel analyses of data from a previous study (Csifcsák et al., 2020), in which a group of healthy adults was intermittently exposed to compromised control over outcomes ("yoking"). Earlier, we reported effects of yoking on latent parameters of RL and oscillatory activity during decision-making, whereas now we analyzed whether the FRN was also sensitive to our controllability manipulation. Participants were randomized to "control" or "yoked" groups, differing only in their level of control over outcomes during an RL task. The FRN was analyzed both in terms of its valence-sensitivity and with respect to its association with single-trial RPEs/SPEs. Bayesian statistics confirmed comparable ratings of perceived control in the two groups, indicating IoC for yoked participants. Although response accuracy was at chance level during compromised outcome controllability, the FRN was statistically indistinguishable between the two groups, as revealed by a multitude of analytical approaches. We conclude that under IoC, the FRN is not sensitive to response-outcome contingencies, and thus, it does not reflect drops in performance. These findings suggest that the cortical analysis of outcomes is dominated by higher-order cognitive/affective states when predictions about future events are unreliable.