An Empirical Stalemate: Why Science Fails to Settle a Central Philosophical Debate About Perception

ABSTRACT Empirical arguments in the philosophy of perception have become increasingly influential. In this paper, we evaluate the prospects for one such argument—the Argument from Structure —in light of the a priori constraint that we must give a unified account of visual experience. We argue that, correctly understood, the kinds of empirical findings marshalled in support of an internalist conclusion about color experience (or secondary quality experience more broadly) provide similar support for an externalist conclusion about shape experience (or primary quality experience more broadly). When coupled with the a priori requirement that we give a uniform metaphysical account of the two kinds of experience, we find ourselves with two arguments, equal in force, for opposing internalist and externalist conclusions about visual experience as a whole. Such empirical arguments, then, rather than taking us beyond the limitations of armchair theorizing, effectively leave us with a dialectical stalemate.