A typology of authoritarian social policy design under uncertainty

This study examines how authoritarian regimes design social policies during crises, emphasizing how distinct forms of uncertainty shape policy instruments and governance strategies. Introducing a typology of uncertainty; relational, epistemic, legitimacy-driven, and structural, this study analyzes how regimes balance centralized authority and perceived legitimacy. The findings reveal that authoritarian policy design operates according to distinct logic where regime stability systematically outweighs technical problem-solving considerations. Egypt high epistemic uncertainty drove information control strategies combining censorship with selective welfare provision. Iran structural uncertainty resulted in improvised governance arrangements blending formal state mechanisms with informal networks. Tunisia relational uncertainty prompted emulation strategies balancing responsiveness with enhanced surveillance. Jordan legitimacy-driven uncertainty led to robust redundancy approaches using overlapping welfare programs to maintain domestic support. The study demonstrates that authoritarian regimes strategically select from authority-based, treasure-based, nodality-based, and organization-based instruments based on their specific uncertainty profile, with policy choices reflecting calculated tradeoffs between control maintenance and legitimacy preservation rather than optimal problem resolution. These patterns challenge democratic-centric policy design theories and reveal how authoritarian adaptability often comes at the expense of democratic governance through crisis-justified surveillance expansion, patronage network reinforcement, and civic mobilization prevention. The REeLS framework provides scholars and practitioners with analytical tools to decode authoritarian policy architectures and anticipate regime responses to emerging crises, contributing to comparative policy design theory that accounts for diverse governance realities in our multipolar world.