Moral Agreement With Punished Acts Decreases Perceptions of Punisher Legitimacy and Willingness to Obey the Law

Punishment is a critical mechanism through which society regulates behavior, yet its efficacy depends on how observers interpret the legitimacy of punishers. Across five experiments, we examine how moral agreement with punished acts shapes perceptions of punishers' legitimacy and willingness to obey laws. Experiment 1 finds that when observers morally agree with punished acts, they perceive punishers as less legitimate and report lower willingness to obey laws. Experiment 2 shows that this effect extends to compliance with a new, specific law introduced by the punishing authority. Experiment 3 finds that when moral agreement and procedural justice are manipulated simultaneously, only moral agreement predicts willingness to obey laws. Experiment 4 replicates these effects among participants with criminal records. Experiment 5 shows that these patterns persist when addressing potential confounds and when moral preferences are weaker. Our findings challenge procedural justice models, highlighting the importance of addressing moral disagreement in policy contexts.