Dataset of SCADA traffic captures from a medical waste incinerator with injected cyberattacks

This paper presents network traffic captures from a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system installed in a medical waste incinerator. The dataset comprises 14 daily packet capture files (day01.pcap to day14.pcap), collected over a two-week period from a Siemens S7-1500/ET200MP-based SCADA system. The total number of packets in all files is over 19 million packets. The traffic was captured using Wireshark on the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) terminal directly connected to the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), recording network communication via the OPC and PROFINET protocols. In addition, eight traffic captures were generated by injecting relevant synthetic cyber-attack traffic into selected daily captures to simulate real-life attack scenarios, including Man-in-the-Middle (MITM), Replay, Packet Fuzzing, Command Flooding, Data Spoofing, Protocol Exploitation, Stealthy Command Injection, and SYN Flooding. Each attack-injected files contains approximately 20,000 attack packets. This dataset is invaluable to support cybersecurity research in industrial control systems (ICS), and it provides a comprehensive resource for analyzing normal SCADA behavior and for evaluating intrusion detection systems (IDS) under various common attack conditions.

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Publication Details

Journal
Data in Brief
Published
2025-11-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dib.2025.112294
Primary Topic
Smart Grid Security and Resilience
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Dataset of SCADA traffic captures from a medical waste incinerator with injected cyberattacks

Ahmed S. Shatnawi, Basheer Al‐Duwairi, Ahmad Al‐Hammouri, Mohammad Ababneh
Data in Brief
Smart Grid Security and Resilience
article

Dataset of SCADA traffic captures from a medical waste incinerator with injected cyberattacks

Ahmed S. Shatnawi, Basheer Al‐Duwairi, Ahmad Al‐Hammouri, Mohammad Ababneh
article en

Abstract

This paper presents network traffic captures from a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system installed in a medical waste incinerator. The dataset comprises 14 daily packet capture files (day01.pcap to day14.pcap), collected over a two-week period from a Siemens S7-1500/ET200MP-based SCADA system. The total number of packets in all files is over 19 million packets. The traffic was captured using Wireshark on the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) terminal directly connected to the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), recording network communication via the OPC and PROFINET protocols. In addition, eight traffic captures were generated by injecting relevant synthetic cyber-attack traffic into selected daily captures to simulate real-life attack scenarios, including Man-in-the-Middle (MITM), Replay, Packet Fuzzing, Command Flooding, Data Spoofing, Protocol Exploitation, Stealthy Command Injection, and SYN Flooding. Each attack-injected files contains approximately 20,000 attack packets. This dataset is invaluable to support cybersecurity research in industrial control systems (ICS), and it provides a comprehensive resource for analyzing normal SCADA behavior and for evaluating intrusion detection systems (IDS) under various common attack conditions.

Data in BriefVol. 63
Dakota State University (US), Jordan University of Science and Technology (JO)
Openalex Percentile: Top 56%
Smart Grid Security and Resilience
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Dataset of SCADA traffic captures from a medical waste incinerator with injected cyberattacks — Ahmed S. Shatnawi, Basheer Al‐Duwairi, et al. · Data in Brief (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS