MargoAnderson and WilliamSeltzerUse and Misuse of the United States Census: The Role of Data in the Incarceration of Japanese Americans in World War IISpringer, 2024, 230 p., $44.99

This book's subtitle should actually be its title. It is not a general consideration of proper census use or set of examples of use and misuse of the census. It is focused almost exclusively on the use of 1940 U.S. Census data in the identification of Japanese citizens and those of Japanese background (race is recorded as Japanese in the 1940 Census) for the purpose of mass incarceration. The book spotlights how geopolitical moments, perceived threats to national security, and accompanying popular politics can place strain on data custodians even at the highest level. The authors demonstrate the specific characters, relationships and legal mechanisms that led to the U.S. 1940 Census breach. Following the issuance of Executive Order 9066 that authorized the forced evacuation and rehousing of anyone living in a military area who could present a threat to national security, over 120,000 Japanese Americans—more than half of whom were American citizens—were moved out of their homes and contained in ten incarceration camps. There are many terrible aspects of this incarceration of Japanese Americans, including the conditions in which people were held and the loss of houses, businesses, and other property, but this book deals specifically with the role of the 1940 Census data in enabling authorities to identify and locate all citizens of Japanese background. Anderson and Seltzer are a well-qualified team to elucidate violations of the law, unethical actions, and actors on various sides of this policy debate regarding the illegal appropriation of US Census data. Anderson is the author of a highly regarded history of the US Census, and Seltzer held important positions at the US Census Bureau, the Population Council, and the United Nations as a statistician and demographer and specializes in the use of population data systems in facilitating human rights abuse. This book will be of interest to demographers, historians, and parties interested in human rights as well as those interested in data privacy, the integrity of official statistics, governmental integrity, and public trust. Suspicion of citizens of an enemy country during time of war is common, and there was consideration of detaining German and Italian citizens during the Second World War, but this was never implemented. There seems to have been little suspicion of American citizens of German or Italian ancestry. Government and the general population feared an attack on the West Coast by Japan and the possibility of espionage provoked by Japan and aided by Japanese Americans, but there were no cases found of espionage by Japanese Americans. There was enormous prejudice against Japanese, along with concern from agricultural and fishing interests about competition from Japanese Americans. These factors lead to pressure for incarceration of all Japanese, regardless of citizenship. Census data on individuals were protected by law against release to anyone, including the Defense Department or any agency. There was also a restriction on publication of aggregate data that could easily be used to identify individuals (Census Act of 1929). These restrictions were under strong attack by those who argued that census microdata on Japanese, citizens or not, were necessary for the war effort. Such tensions between privacy and demand for microdata for war, national security, or criminal prosecution purposes are common. Many data on Japanese citizens who were born outside of the United States were obtainable from Alien Registration (Smith Act passed June 28, 1940) because foreign-born Japanese were not eligible for naturalization at this time, but data on US-born citizens who identified as Japanese were only available from the 1940 Census. There had been calls for relaxation of census privacy laws since 1939 and the Second War Powers Act (passed March 27, 1942, relevant parts repealed March 31, 1947) allowed release of data on individuals to government agencies for purposes of prosecution of war. The restriction on release of aggregate data that could be used to identify individuals was violated earlier. Franklin Carter, who worked on domestic intelligence for President Roosevelt, asked for 1940 Census detailed tables for Japanese citizens and for Japanese American citizens for five Pacific states in November 1941—before Pearl Harbor. By November 9, the Census Bureau had completed the requested tabulations. It is not completely clear exactly what table data on small geographic areas were released to help identify Japanese Americans for evacuation to the War Authorities, but it is clear that both kinds of data were released and were key in evacuation planning and implementation. Much of this book is implicitly concerned with the actions for which Census personnel could be blamed. The bulk of the blame for Census Bureau actions lies with their leadership. There had been proposals to weaken census data protections as early as 1939, which were generally opposed by Census personnel, including the Director. The Director was one of only two political appointees. Willam Austin was Census Director and a defender of census data privacy. Clyde Capt was appointed Director in 1941. He had no background in statistics or census taking. Capt was squarely in the group favoring the maximal use of census data to support the war effort. After the Second War Powers Act was passed, the Census Bureau had to surrender requested information. The carrying out of the evacuation and deplorable conditions of incarceration were not the Bureau's fault. However, for many years after WWII, the Census Bureau denied having released information on individuals. Only in 2000, Census Director Kenneth Prewitt publicly apologized for the Census Bureau's role in the internment of Japanese Americans in WWII. And only in 2007, Anderson and Seltzer definitively showed that there had been release of data on individuals. The decades of denial is reminiscent of the Tuskegee Study, which infected African American men with syphilis to study the course of the disease beginning in 1932. The study continued until 1972, when its existence was revealed, but it was not until 1997 that President Clinton issued an official apology. These two terrible incidents resulted in some good, albeit decades later. Reactions to Census Bureau involvement in the Japanese American incarceration led to stronger data privacy rules than had existed before WWII. Reactions to the Tuskegee Study led to the Belmont Report and subsequent protections for human subjects in research. Yet, this book is timely and sobering in the current climate, where debates about data privacy and inter-agency data sharing are again center stage in the US context. Meanwhile global shifts away from censuses and toward linked administrative data streams and biometric samples, as well as the wider data revolution and the advent of big data, mean digesting the lessons of this study is critical to defending privacy protection and safeguarding human rights.