Educational Falsehoods

Responsible policymaking often relies on esoteric scientific knowledge. Yet, in a democracy, policymaking also requires support from laypeople who lack this knowledge. Is it permissible for experts to communicate falsehoods about esoteric matters to bolster this public support? The standard answer is “no.” A near-consensus view, in democratic theory and philosophy of science, holds that experts should be honest. The present article challenges this position by defending a particular category of falsehoods: educational falsehoods. My argument proceeds in two parts. The first contends that, in non-ideal circumstances, communicating falsehoods can play an indispensable epistemic function, by educating the public about urgent scientific matters. The second part addresses a pressing objection: namely, that educational falsehoods are deceptive, which in turn makes them inimical to autonomy, public trust, and democratic accountability. Although this objection proves unsuccessful, I argue that it helps clarify the conditions under which deploying educational falsehoods is permissible.