An evolutionary game theoretic approach to analysis of innovative behavior of tech firms and startups considering equity-based or non-equity-based mechanisms

Purpose This study aims to examine how tech firms and startups interact in the process of green technology innovation, particularly in collaborative decision-making. It seeks to understand how intangible factors such as government incentives, corporate commitments and startups’ sustainability efforts shape the evolution of collaboration mechanisms and influence system stability. Design/methodology/approach This study uses evolutionary game theory and system dynamics to analyze the strategic interactions between tech firms and startups in the context of green technology innovation. The research models the evolutionary trends of collaboration mechanisms, incorporating factors such as startups’ green efforts, tech firms’ commitments and government interventions. Simulations are used to observe the system’s behavior under various conditions. Findings The findings indicate that the system balance occurs with a delay, and dynamic control policies of tech firms can reduce fluctuations and accelerate equilibrium. Additionally, government subsidies for green entrepreneurship encourage collaboration between tech firms and startups, enhancing system stability. Originality/value This research contributes to the understanding of green tech collaboration mechanisms by integrating evolutionary game theory and system dynamics. Unlike previous studies, it highlights the delayed balancing process and proposes dynamic control-based policies as a solution. Additionally, it underscores the role of government subsidies in promoting sustainable entrepreneurial ecosystems.