Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of collaborative innovation in the low-altitude economy: a case study of Shenzhen

In the Low-Altitude Economy, effective innovation is crucial for sustainable urban development, requiring governance that balances the interests of government, enterprises, and research institutions. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model based on the case of Shenzhen as a pioneering city in China to explore this synergy. The findings provide operational policy tools for urban planners: (1) Cooperation stability peaks when technological upgrade benefits are distributed between 0.65 and 0.7; (2) Economic value from technology commercialization drives convergence to an ideal equilibrium, particularly within a range of 20 to 600 million yuan; (3) A critical threshold of approximately 6 million yuan exists for government policy costs—exceeding this significantly reduces willingness to participate. These parameters and mechanisms are essential for effective policy design. In conclusion, the study identifies key mechanisms and conditions that promote collaborative governance in the Low-Altitude Economy based on incentive compatibility principles, making its proposed framework valuable for other cities’ low-altitude economic policies.