Reform of the new power system: A game analysis of power marketization from the perspective of carbon-green certificate coupling

Driven by China's dual carbon goals, power market reform is accelerating to build a new renewable energy centered power system. This study focuses on new energy's full market entry, constructing a three-stage Stackelberg dynamic game model integrating power, carbon, and green certificate markets, with heterogeneous generators and grid companies. The study systematically explores three differentiated power production decision-making models and analyzes their power generation volume, electricity prices, total electricity demand, the proportion of mechanism electricity participation. Additionally, by leveraging the synergistic effects of multi-threshold parameters, the study verifies the impact of mechanism electricity price and green certificate price sensitivity coefficients on the equilibrium solution. The research indicates that regardless of whether power generators have risk preferences, the price differential settlement mechanism can achieve Pareto optimization and play a significant policy-supporting role; mechanism electricity prices influence market supply demand structures and profit distribution patterns through ‘two-way regulation’, enabling renewable energy enterprises to achieve a stable 15 % increase in revenue; Green preference coefficients, mechanism-based electricity prices, and green certificate sensitivity coefficients influence power market equilibrium, facilitating the transition of electricity pricing from policy-driven to market-driven; however, under risk-averse conditions, the price differential settlement strategy, while mitigating market volatility, also compresses supply chain profit margins to some extent. The findings of this study provide important reference for the development of new power systems and the marketization of renewable energy. • Construct a three-stage Stackelberg model integrating the power, carbon, and green certificate markets, encompassing traditional/renewable energy generators and power grid. • The price differential settlement mechanism achieves Pareto optimization. • Consumer green preference, mechanism electricity price and green certificate price sensitivity coefficient synergistically influence market equilibrium, driving electricity pricing from policy-driven to market-driven.