Verifiable Auction Mechanisms for Material Reuse in the Built Environment

Built environments face significant challenges in promoting material reuse due to the lack of trustworthy and transparent trading mechanisms. Existing digital platforms often fail to ensure fairness, bid confidentiality, and auditability. To address this gap, this paper presents the design and implementation of a verifiable auction system for trading reusable construction materials. Built on a Polkadot-based platform, the system supports sealed reverse auctions through a hybrid on-chain/off-chain architecture: encrypted and signed bids are stored in InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), while a Merkle root of valid bids is committed on-chain. Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) enable verification of bid correctness without revealing bid values. Stress testing showed moderate latency from proof generation and IPFS operations, yet performance remained suitable for auctions lasting minutes or hours. The results demonstrate a scalable, privacy-preserving, and auditable auction mechanism that leverages decentralised technologies to advance circular economy goals.

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Published
2025-10-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/bcca66705.2025.11229665
Primary Topic
Auction Theory and Applications
Type
article
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article

Verifiable Auction Mechanisms for Material Reuse in the Built Environment

Stanly Wilson, Yinhao Li, Omer Rana, Ellis Solaiman et al.
Auction Theory and Applications
article

Verifiable Auction Mechanisms for Material Reuse in the Built Environment

Stanly Wilson, Yinhao Li, Omer Rana, Ellis Solaiman, Kwabena Adu-Duodu, Rajiv Ranjan, Tanapon Suwankesawong
article en

Abstract

Built environments face significant challenges in promoting material reuse due to the lack of trustworthy and transparent trading mechanisms. Existing digital platforms often fail to ensure fairness, bid confidentiality, and auditability. To address this gap, this paper presents the design and implementation of a verifiable auction system for trading reusable construction materials. Built on a Polkadot-based platform, the system supports sealed reverse auctions through a hybrid on-chain/off-chain architecture: encrypted and signed bids are stored in InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), while a Merkle root of valid bids is committed on-chain. Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) enable verification of bid correctness without revealing bid values. Stress testing showed moderate latency from proof generation and IPFS operations, yet performance remained suitable for auctions lasting minutes or hours. The results demonstrate a scalable, privacy-preserving, and auditable auction mechanism that leverages decentralised technologies to advance circular economy goals.

Nagpur Institute of Technology (IN), Newcastle University (GB)
Openalex Percentile: Top 60%
Auction Theory and Applications
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Verifiable Auction Mechanisms for Material Reuse in the Built Environment — Stanly Wilson, Yinhao Li, et al. · (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS