Smoke and Mirrors: Strategic Messaging and the Politics of Noncompliance

Public allegations of international law violations are common in international politics. When do these accusations generate international backlash for governments? We argue that political costs hinge on a rhetorical battle to shape perceptions of the government’s behavior. Governments use strategic messaging to contest information, challenge the appropriateness of international law, or cite extenuating circumstances. International organizations (IOs) counter government rhetoric to reinforce the law. These competing messages shape support for punishment among citizens and political elites. We test our argument with survey experiments measuring perceptions of alleged military aggression and human rights violations. Among the US public and a global sample of diplomatic elites, foreign government denials and claims about mitigating circumstances reduce punitive attitudes. IO rebuttals counter denials but can only partially neutralize other claims. We offer a new framework for analyzing the politics of noncompliance and present novel evidence illuminating the strengths and limitations of IOs in enforcing international law.

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Publication Details

Journal
UNC Libraries
Published
2025-08-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.17615/exwg-0811
Primary Topic
Media Influence and Politics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Smoke and Mirrors: Strategic Messaging and the Politics of Noncompliance

Tyler Pratt, Julia C. Morse
UNC Libraries
Media Influence and Politics
article

Smoke and Mirrors: Strategic Messaging and the Politics of Noncompliance

Tyler Pratt, Julia C. Morse
article en

Abstract

Public allegations of international law violations are common in international politics. When do these accusations generate international backlash for governments? We argue that political costs hinge on a rhetorical battle to shape perceptions of the government’s behavior. Governments use strategic messaging to contest information, challenge the appropriateness of international law, or cite extenuating circumstances. International organizations (IOs) counter government rhetoric to reinforce the law. These competing messages shape support for punishment among citizens and political elites. We test our argument with survey experiments measuring perceptions of alleged military aggression and human rights violations. Among the US public and a global sample of diplomatic elites, foreign government denials and claims about mitigating circumstances reduce punitive attitudes. IO rebuttals counter denials but can only partially neutralize other claims. We offer a new framework for analyzing the politics of noncompliance and present novel evidence illuminating the strengths and limitations of IOs in enforcing international law.

UNC Libraries
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 56%
Media Influence and Politics
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Smoke and Mirrors: Strategic Messaging and the Politics of Noncompliance — Tyler Pratt, Julia C. Morse · UNC Libraries (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS