Dignity, properly used, could be a useful construct in AI ethics
Rueda et al. argue that the concept of dignity is problematic for AI ethics due to its complexity, ambiguity, and biased usage. While agreeing on many points, we propose that adding the necessary precision to the use of the term is neither difficult nor onerous. Further, doing so may allow understanding of the factors that promote dignity affirmation, match the multifaceted nature of AI systems themselves, and promote pragmatically better design outcomes than will be likely if the idea is avoided in AI ethics discussions.
Authors
- Lorenn P. Ruster (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4267-7680)
- Sakshi Ghai (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8488-0273)
- Neela Saldanha
- Cait Lamberton (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7160-7270)
Institutions
- Australian National University (AU)
- Yale University (US)
- University of Pennsylvania (US)
- London School of Economics and Political Science (GB)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Patterns
- Published
- 2025-11-01
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patter.2025.101396
- Primary Topic
- Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00