Gender Relativism: The Case from Retraction

Abstract This paper argues that debates concerning gender terms and context sensitivity should take into account retraction, i.e., the ability to take back a previously true assertion of one’s gender identity. We begin by rejecting the intuition that gender terms should vary in truth value based on the “medical” and “bathroom” scenarios, where a trans woman (or man) should be classed as a woman (or man) in the latter, but not the former because she (or he) lacks certain organs (e.g. cervix or testicles). Assigning authority to self-identification, we hold that if someone identifies as a woman in bathroom scenarios she should also be classed as a woman in medical scenarios. Instead, we draw support for context sensitivity of gender terms from retraction data. We take gender retraction to be supported by the testimonies of trans people. Specifically, we explore the less discussed Later in Life narrative where individuals come to realise their true gender identities later in life. After demonstrating the shortfalls of existing contextualist accounts of retraction, we present a novel version of semantic relativism - Gender Relativism - that is faithful to gender testimonies. Our view accounts for retraction, takes into consideration self-identification and explains why transphobic denials of an individual’s gender testimony are false.