Extort from Them, but Only if They Comply: Experimental Evidence from Khorog on the Effect of Observed Behavior on Normative Expectations

We are the first to examine the influence of empirical information on both actual behavior and normative expectations in the context of extortion. To this end, we conduct a laboratory experiment that involves a multi-round coordination game, in which participants receive information about the behavior of "officials" and "citizens" playing a harassment bribery game in an adjacent room. While prior research generally finds that empirical information shapes normative expectations, our results reveal an important asymmetry in the case of extortion. Specifically, information about frequency of extortion does not affect perceptions of the social acceptability of extortion, while information about frequency of complying with extortion does. Moreover, we replicate the previously observed pattern from collusive bribery contexts: a contagion effect occurs without a corresponding conformism effect. Our results demonstrate that this dynamic similarly applies to extortion. These findings offer actionable insights for anticorruption agencies, particularly in deciding which information to publicize to promote norm change and improve policy effectiveness.