Stakeholder Strategies and Cooperation for Rural Water Supply Security in China

ABSTRACT Based on the Chinese context, this study uses evolutionary game theory to analyse the factors affecting rural water supply security, modelling regulators, water suppliers and farmers as players to explore the feasibility of effective cooperation mechanisms. Key findings include the following: (1) Eight stable equilibrium strategies exist under certain conditions. (2) Increased net benefits from active regulation lead regulators to enforce rules more rigorously, with higher penalties enhancing their willingness. (3) Water suppliers are more likely to adopt stringent safety measures when the benefits of providing safe water increase, thereby reducing the need for regulatory intervention. (4) Farmers are more inclined to monitor water quality when participation benefits increase, prompting utilities to enhance safety. Therefore, policymakers should strengthen regulatory frameworks to encourage stakeholder participation and establish effective communication and collaboration mechanisms. This study's novelty lies in applying evolutionary game theory to multi‐stakeholder interactions in rural water supply, promoting cooperation and improving management strategies.