Nature and the law: In defence of a pluriversal, more‐than‐human approach

Abstract How can nature be incorporated into the law? How should nature be incorporated into the law? Inspired by the nascent Law and Nature movement, this article develops responses to these two questions. First, I discuss three key points of differentiation in the rights of nature (RoN) movement—form, mechanism, and orientation. In terms of form, jurisdictions vary according to whether they pursue legal personhood or direct legal rights. As far as mechanisms by which interests are regarded, most contexts utilise some form of anthropocentric representation while more‐than‐human approaches have yet to be adequately explored. With respect to orientation, the RoN movement is settling into two schools—technocratic and cultural—marked by divergent onto‐epistemological foundations. In order to overcome these cleavages and bring RoN in line with what I argue are vital normative obligations, I propose several suggestions that clarify the scope, method, and function of such rights. I conclude that the success or failure of the proposed Law and Nature initiative hinges on its willingness to reject conventional legal thinking in favour of radical departures from modern law like those prescribed here.