Variations in the enforcement of China’s platform regulation

Abstract Although several studies have examined why China regulates digital platforms, few have addressed why some platforms receive more severe penalties than do others. This research argues that variations in regulatory penalties result from the severity of firm-specific violations, specifically the degree of a violation and its effect on state security. This logic applies in institutional contexts where China, as a “compressed” developer, regulates leading homegrown platforms in an era of weaponized interdependence, and where top regulators have both the capacity and preference to balance state regulation with platform development. It employed case studies and controlled comparisons to analyze variations in penalties imposed on platforms within the same ecosystem (Ant Group, Alibaba Cloud, and Alibaba e-commerce) and the more severe penalties across different ecosystems (Ant Group and Didi). It enriches research on the state–platform nexus, variations in enforcement, China’s regulatory state, and the role of regulation in the developmental context.