Information Sharing, Selling Modes, and Logistics Service Strategies in an E‐Commerce Supply Chain

ABSTRACT E‐commerce sales have become increasingly common and important. Manufacturers generally wholesale products to platforms that subsequently resell to customers (reselling), or directly sell to customers through platforms by paying a commission rate (agency selling). In both selling formats, manufacturers can choose between the platforms' logistics and their own logistics for product delivery, generating four typical modes: (1) reselling+platform logistics (RP); (2) reselling+manufacturer logistics (RM); (3) agency selling+platform logistics (AP); and (4) agency selling+manufacturer logistics (AM). Motivated by the fact that platforms possess superior demand information and apply it to improve operational decisions, this paper investigates how a platform strategically shares information to induce a manufacturer to adopt a more efficient mode. We find that the manufacturer's mode preference is significantly influenced by information asymmetry. If the platform possesses highly accurate information (i.e., the information accuracy level is high), the manufacturer prefers the AP mode, and this preference strengthens as the platform's logistics investment efficiency improves. Otherwise, the manufacturer prefers the AM (RP) mode if the logistics improvement efficiency is low (high). However, when the platform's information accuracy level is high but investment efficiency is low, the platform will commit to sharing information to induce the manufacturer to adopt the AM (RP) mode rather than the AP mode if logistics improvement efficiency is low (high). Notably, as the platform's logistics investment efficiency gradually improves, these induced changes in mode selection can be reversed under certain conditions, while the negative impact of information sharing on consumer surplus and social welfare becomes increasingly significant.