Robust Federated-Learning-Based Classifier for Smart Grid Power Quality Disturbances
The transition from traditional power systems to smart grids demands advanced methods for detecting and classifying Power Quality Disturbances (PQDs)-variations in voltage, current, or frequency that disrupt device performance. The rise of renewable energy and nonlinear loads, such as LED lighting, has increased PQD occurrences. While deep learning models can effectively analyze data from grid sensors to detect PQD occurrences, privacy concerns often prevent operators from sharing raw data which is necessary to train the models. To address this, Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative model training without exposing sensitive information. However, FL's decentralized design introduces new risks, particularly data poisoning attacks, where malicious clients corrupt model updates to degrade the global model accuracy. Despite these risks, PQD classification under FL and its vulnerability to such attacks remain largely unexplored. In this work, we develop FL-based classifiers for PQD detection and compare their performance to traditionally trained, centralized models. As expected from prior FL research, we observed a slight drop in performance: the model's accuracy decreased from 97% (centralized) to 96% (FL), while the false alarm rate increased from 0.19% to 4%. We also emulate five poisoning scenarios, including indiscriminate attacks aimed at degrading model accuracy and class-specific attacks intended to hide particular disturbance types. Our experimental results show that the attacks are very successful in reducing the accuracy of the classifier. Furthermore, we implement a detection mechanism designed to identify and isolate corrupted client updates, preventing them from influencing the global model. Experimental results reveal that our defense substantially curtails the performance degradation induced by poisoned updates, thereby preserving the robustness of the global model against adversarial influence.
Authors
- Mahmoud M. Badr (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8986-001X)
- Ayman El‐Sayed (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4437-259X)
- Mohamed I. Ibrahem (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8000-4161)
- Maazen Alsabaan (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8601-3184)
- Mohamed Mahmoud (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8719-501X)
- Atef H. Bondok (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6790-8310)
- Tariq Alshawi (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1889-8977)
Institutions
- Eastern Connecticut State University (US)
- Benha University (EG)
- Augusta University (US)
- King Saud University (SA)
- Augusta University Health (US)
- Tennessee Technological University (US)
- SUNY Polytechnic Institute (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Sensors
- Published
- 2025-11-11
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.3390/s25226880
- Primary Topic
- Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- King Saud University