SoCurity: Enhancing SoC Security with Anomalous Activity Detection and Localization
As systems-on-a-chip (SoCs) that power our devices become increasingly heterogeneous to meet low-power, high-performance computational requirements, they also become more vulnerable to the possible impacts of an on-chip resource availability attack. In this article, we present SoCurity, the first network-on-chip (NoC) counter-based hardware monitoring approach for enhancing heterogeneous SoC security. With this monitoring approach, we develop a fast, lightweight anomalous activity detection and localization system at the hardware level. The presented detection system uses semi-supervised machine learning models, and requires no prior attack knowledge for detecting anomalous activity. This design choice provides protection against existing and novel future attacks impacting on-chip resource availability. Our localization engine leverages the inherent interpretability of SoCurity’s NoC counters to locate detected anomalous activity in the SoC for focused recovery. We demonstrate our techniques with a case study on a real SoC implementation for a connected autonomous vehicle system and find up to 96% detection accuracy and fast detection (∼30µs for prediction on an ASIC) in online experiments. Furthermore, we show that the flagged anomalous activity can be reliably localized for up to 99% of detected anomalous activity in our experiments.
Authors
- Margaret Martonosi (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9683-8032)
- Naorin Hossain (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0006-6817-1545)
- Pradip Bose (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1380-5671)
- Alper Buyuktosunoglu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5341-8916)
- John-David Wellman (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0223-7792)
Institutions
- IBM (United States) (US)
- Princeton University (US)
- Alliance for Safe Kids (US)
- IBM Research (China) (CN)
- Laboratoire d'Informatique de Paris-Nord (FR)
Publication Details
- Journal
- ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization
- Published
- 2025-11-12
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3776585
- Primary Topic
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00