Equilibrium Analysis of an Agricultural Evolutionary Game Under New Quality Productive Forces Policy

New quality agricultural productivity is essential for advancing agricultural modernization, consolidating and expanding achievements in poverty alleviation, and driving rural revitalization. However, leveraging this productivity to facilitate industrial upgrading and support the transition of smallholder farmers remains challenging. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, agricultural enterprises, and farmers within the policy framework of new quality agricultural productivity. By applying evolutionary game theory, we analyze the strategic interactions among policy implementation, farmer welfare, and the development of new quality agricultural productivity. Equilibrium analysis reveals that the government, as a regulatory actor, should provide appropriate subsidies to agricultural enterprises and farmers, undertake initial infrastructure improvements, diversify subsidy instruments, establish special incentives for agricultural technology innovation, and increase investment in cultivating new agricultural talent. Agricultural enterprises, as dynamic agents, should adopt proactive and systematic transformation strategies. Furthermore, they need to strengthen benefit-linked mechanisms with farmers to ensure sustained collaboration.